This paper investigates how path dependence may come about in inter-organizational networks. To do so, we focus our analysis on one particular type of network management practices -bargaining practices -and ask whether and how they can become path-dependent.
INTRODUCTION
Networks have traditionally been characterised as flexible forms of organization (Powell, 1990 ). However, it has recently been suspected that inter-organizational networks may also become inert over time (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006) , possibly even become pathdependent (Manning & Sydow, 2011; Maurer & Ebers, 2006) . Our general research question therefore asks under exactly what circumstances such networks may become path-dependent.
While one source of path dependence may of course be the organizations participating in an inter-organizational network (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997) , we highlight the contribution of "relational practices" (Ness, 2009 ). More specifically, we focus on one particular type of relational or network management practices: bargaining practices. Bargaining occurs when two or more parties can jointly create a cooperative surplus but need to coordinate a way of distributing it amongst themselves (Muthoo, 1999; Nash, 1950; Rubinstein, 1982) . Bargaining practices, then, are recurrent activities through which the network partners agree to identify and distribute their cooperative surplus.
Bargaining practices are especially suitable for studying inter-organizational path dependence because they -by definition -emerge from the interactions of two or more organizations and can be assumed to become inert after a while because the organizations get used to the practices, routinize them and are even likely to adopt other management practices that fit the focal bargaining practices. But under what conditions exactly do they become not only inert but path-dependent? In order to answer this research question, we first recapitulate the theory of organizational path dependence and present an operationalization of this theory with the help of indicators that are suitable to depict the development of an organizational path in general and of the path dependence of bargaining practices in inter-organizational networks in particular. After introducing the research setting -three regional networks in the photonics industry in Germany -and our methods, we present our results case by case. In the 3 final section we compare and discuss these results and the limitations of the study. Major contributions of this study are not only the operationalization of the theory of organizational path dependence but also the extension of this theory to the network level of analysis.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Organizational Path Dependence
This paper uses a framework that is based upon the emerging theory of organizational path dependence (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009) . Path dependence theory is concerned with explaining stable -i.e. repeatedly occurring -phenomena. The basic claim of this theory, which is based upon the seminal works by David (1985) and Arthur (1994) and more recent modifications by institutional theorists (North, 1990; Pierson, 2000) , is that (some cases of) stability can be explained by a specific dynamic marked by three distinct phases: the preformation phase, the path formation phase, and the actual lock-in phase. In the preformation phase, a number of alternative organizational solutions are available and one or several 'small events' trigger the initial adoption of one of them. In the path formation phase, this initially adopted solution is used increasingly because of at least one self-reinforcing mechanism; correspondingly, alternative solutions are excluded increasingly. In the lock-in phase, the focal organizational or inter-organizational solution is rigidly replicated and alternatives become nearly -but not totally -extinct. All three phases are summarized in the following figure 1.
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In order to apply this model to specific empirical cases we need to operationalize its abstract definitions. Towards this end, we will derive three empirical indicators for each of these three phases. Indicators are an intermediary step between abstract concepts and actual evidence of practices: on the one hand, they are derived from the abstract phases of path dependence; on the other hand, they are measureable and therefore provide guidance for empirical analyses.
According to the theory of path dependence, the path formation phase is characterized by "an initial scope of choice" (Sydow et al., 2009: 692) . Hence, a first indicator of a preformation phase implies that there must have been at least one theoretically available alternative to the one that developed into the organizational path -otherwise the solution would be deterministic (Indicator I1). Although the presence of such an alternative needs to hold for the subsequent path phases as well, we attach this indicator to the preformation phase because it is the precondition to starting any empirical path analysis and should therefore top the list of indicators. A second indicator is that one or several alternatives need to have been not only theoretically but also practically viable -otherwise a path interpretation is purely hypothetical (I2). The third indicator concerns the end of a preformation phase. A small contingent event needs to be discernible (I3), that is, "… an event that was not expected to take place, given certain theoretical understandings of how causal processes work" (Mahoney, 2000: 531) , which triggered decisions or actions influencing the alternative to follow. An event is contingent if it is neither deterministic ('necessary') nor random.
The path formation phase is characterised by the self-reinforcing dynamic of positive feedback, which is at the core of the theory of organizational paths (Sydow et al., 2009: 698) and similarly possesses three theoretical features. First, the fundamental idea of 'selfreinforcement' is that "… the increase of a particular variable leads to a further increase of this very variable" (Sydow et al., 2009: 694 ). Hence we must be able to measure, at the very least, two consecutive increases of the same variable (I4). Second, some self-reinforcing 5 mechanism must explain how the first increase leads to the second increase (I5). Various mechanisms have been suggested in this context and the next section will analyze how they can be disentangled. Third, there must be some but fewer alternatives available than during the preformation phase, i.e. the number of practically viable alternatives and/or their probabilities needs to diminish (I6).
An (organizational) lock-in is defined as "… a preferred action pattern which gets deeply embedded in organizational practice and replicated" (Sydow et al., 2009: 694) . Again, three theoretical features are implied for the lock-in phase. First, replication requires that a nearly identical solution has been used at least twice but ideally more often (I7). Second, it has to be shown that practically viable alternatives are ruled out further (I8) -i.e. that alternatives are even fewer or even less likely than in the preceding path formation phasebut also that there is still 'some scope for variation' (Sydow et al., 2009: 695) . Third, the degree of inertia of the alternative reproduced needs to be distinguished (I9, Jonsson & Regnér, 2009) : 'unaware' indicates that alternatives exist but are not perceived by the actors; 'unwilling' indicates that alternatives exist but that the actors involved do not want to pursue them; 'unable' indicates that the implementation of existing alternatives fails.
Altogether, this operationalization of the three-stage model of organizational path dependence yields nine theoretical features and their corresponding empirical indicators. Figure 2 summarizes the indicators.
The most complex indicator to show empirically is indicator number five, i.e. that one self-reinforcing mechanism at the very least explains the two consecutive increases of a variable. As stated above, self-reinforcing mechanisms have the property that a 'first increase' in a variable leads to a further 'second increase' of the same variable. Self-reinforcing mechanisms drive the path-like development of an organizational solution from its inception at the triggering event to its eventual lock-in. Correspondingly, at the start of a selfreinforcing mechanism an organizational solution has been put into practice at least onceself-reinforcing mechanisms 'only' explain the continuation and expansion of a once established solution but not its inception.
Though heavily debated and varying from one to more than a dozen (Beyer, 2010) , the literature on organizational paths suggests four main self-reinforcing mechanisms through which paths can develop: coordination effects, complementarities, learning effects and adaptive expectations (Sydow et al., 2009) . In the following, we will focus our attention on coordination effects and complementarities, which seem by far the most likely mechanisms driving (inter-) organizational path dependence of bargaining practices. Coordination effects are relevant because any change to a once established distribution of the joint surplus will disfavour at least one partner, who may threaten to terminate the relationship. Anticipating such a reaction, no partner will initiate a change in the first place so that a once established solution perpetuates itself. Complementarities are likely because a successful network may see an ever increasing fit of its members' contributions to the joint surplus. Focusing on coordination effects and complementarities does not imply, however, that learning effects and adaptive expectations have no role to play in a potentially path-dependent development of bargaining practices. Nonetheless, we had to limit our focus to make our overall research manageable and presentable. We will now outline general, abstract definitions of both 7 mechanisms and translate these first into necessary conditions and then into sub-indicators that need to hold when the mechanisms are at work.
Coordination Effects
Coordination effects "build on the benefits of rule-guided behavior: the more actors adopt and apply a specific institution (i.e. an organizational rule or routine), the more efficient the interaction among these actors is, since the behavior of the actors is rule guided and can therefore be anticipated and reactions can be considered in advance" (Sydow et al., 2009: 699) .
Coordination effects have been formally defined by game theorists (Cooper, 1999; Rasmusen, 1994) . We will analyze a slight alteration of the standard coordination game -the 'bargaining game' -to derive two necessary conditions for coordination effects and their corresponding empirical indicators. We will then show how coordination effects contribute to the self-reinforcing stability of bargaining practices.
A simple bargaining game is depicted in Figure 3 . In this example, both players are asked to share a pie of size 1. If they both make equal demands, no one will receive any payoffs so that they are left with the so-called 'disagreement point' of 0 each. If the players make corresponding demands (i.e. 'low' and 'HIGH' or 'LOW' and 'high'), the player asking for the high share receives two thirds of the pie and the other player the remaining one third.
These are also the two pure strategy equilibria (Rasmusen, 1994) .
As can be seen from the payoff matrix, both players prefer not to deviate unilaterally once an equilibrium is reached. Assume we are at the top-right equilibrium in which player 1 plays 'low' and player 2 plays 'HIGH'. If -on the one hand -player 2 single-handedly lowers its demands to 'LOW', he would be left worse off with the disagreement point payoff of 0. If -on the other hand -player 1 unilaterally raises its demand to 'high' then he risks the continuation of the overall relationship and hence a disagreement point payoff of 0. Thus, we are not likely to observe unilateral deviations in any direction by any party. Instead, a once established pattern becomes self-perpetuating. This leads to the first indicator of coordination effects (I5a): a unilateral deviation will not be attempted by either side.
Moreover, in a bargaining game the players' strategies are strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klemperer, 1985) . That is, an increase of one player's demand strategy gives the other player an incentive to lower its demand. This can be explained as follows: assume we start from the same equilibrium in which player 1 plays 'low' and player 2 plays 'HIGH'. If player 1 raised his demand from 'low' to 'high', then player 2 should reduce his demand correspondingly from 'HIGH' to 'LOW', as this would still leave him better off than the disagreement payoff. Hence player 2 has to 'substitute' the increase of player 1's demand strategy.
The fact that strategies are strategic substitutes implies that at least one person is made worse off if we move away from any equilibrium. From this follows that a joint deviation to any other equilibrium will leave at least one party worse off. As it is likely that such a losing party would oppose this move, there should also be no successful attempts at joint deviations.
Thus, a solution that is found once should be self-perpetuating, which may provide a possible explanation of path dependence. This leads us to the second indicator of coordination effects (I5b): a joint deviation will not be attempted.
Complementarities
Complementarities are defined as "… a synergy resulting from the interaction of two or more separate but interrelated resources, rules, or practices" (Sydow et al., 2009: 699) Complementarities are self-reinforcing because they provide an incentive to engage repeatedly in the same action and reap the benefits of the synergy instead of exploring alternatives. "In complementary settings self-reinforcing processes occur when routines and/or practices are interconnected in such a way that it becomes ever more attractive to exploit the synergies or-when referring to the reverse side-to save misfit costs caused by solutions deviating from the established cluster/organizational capability" (Sydow et al., 2009: 699) . In inter-organizational cooperations, this leads to a virtuous cycle: the investment of one partner in the mutual business relation provides an incentive to his counterpart to invest as well. This second investment, in turn, provides a reason for the first partner to increase his initial investment. This "virtuous cycle" forms the second measurable indicator of a self-reinforcing mechanism based on complementarities (I5d). -
RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS
Our empirical setting is the photonics industry in Germany. This industry provides a particularly suitable field for studying the development dynamics of bargaining practices and their potential path dependence. In this industry, joint product development in interorganizational networks is very common, as most organizations are extremely specialised small-and medium-sized companies that need to pool their expertise and components to develop new devices for new applications. Cooperation is therefore a frequent phenomenon, and the networks are even quite heterarchical, so that the terms of mutual cooperations actually get negotiated.
While the appropriate methodology to study organizational path dependence is still debated (e.g. Koch, 2011; Vergne & Durand, 2010) , we use a qualitative case-study design (Yin, 1994) with three cases, all of which show a rather stable pattern in their bargaining practices, giving us enough reason for an initial path suspicion. A qualitative research 11 methodology is especially suited to our purpose: "As scholars have increasingly begun to appreciate the role of dynamic processes (e.g. path dependency or evolutionary processes), rich longitudinal research is needed to provide the details of how these processes actually play out" (Siggelkow, 2007: 22) . Each case -our unit of analysis -is a regional network of photonic organizations in Germany. Cases were selected if joint product development occurred frequently (so that potential instances of bargaining occurred), and all network members were willing to share business sensitive information with the researchers (which was of course anonymized for this paper).
Empirical data was collected to reconstruct the development processes of bargaining practices and to subsequently analyze them regarding their path dependence. A semistructured questionnaire was designed and pilot-tested. In each network, the managers of either all or the most crucial member organizations were interviewed, resulting in 22 interviews. Interviews lasted between one and two hours and were later transcribed and anonymized, producing approximately 650 pages of text. Additional sources like websites, newspaper articles and meeting notes were collected to triangulate the interview information.
Even more importantly, we were able to build upon previous insights gathered in this field for almost a decade.
The transcripts were analyzed using multi-level content analysis (Mayring, 2000) . In a first round of encoding, descriptive codes were assigned to the text to signify the content, timing and actors involved. Subsequently, chronological thick-descriptions were written for each network (Jarzabkowski, 2008) , resulting in another 300 pages of text. A 'patternmatching' approach was then used to analyze the development of the bargaining practices (Yin, 1994) . 'Pattern-matching' means that the actual bargaining practices were checked to see if they exhibited the patterns associated with each of the empirical path indicators. We encoded and tabulated all supportive and inhibitive quotes for the empirical indicators in a second round of coding. An indicator was judged 'present' in a given bargaining practice when the events in the chronology provided supporting evidence.
RESULTS
All three inter-organizational networks create a joint surplus by coordinating the individual activities of their member organizations so that they can jointly manufacture and sell innovative high-tech products. In each network, the high-tech components of individual organizations are combined into sophisticated joint devices. The process of value creation goes hand in hand with a method of value distribution; we will take a closer look at three aspects of it. First, we look at who does what. Since members of all three networks manufacture constitutive components that are combined later, a central bargaining issue is which manufacturing tasks are assigned to which network member. Secondly, we look at network-internal transactions. To assemble joint devices, the usual procedure is that one network member sells its component to another member, which acts as an integrator company. During this network-internal transaction, so-called gains from trade are created.
That is, the buyer values the exchanged goods or service at a higher price than the seller. The bargaining issue is therefore who gets what share of this valuation difference. Third, we look at the way (dis)agreements are codified. For instance, the allocation of tasks can simply be based on an oral agreement or be written down in detailed contracts. Before we turn to these issues, we will outline the genesis and development of each of the networks. We will then conclude each case with a path analysis of its bargaining practice.
Case study A: The "Surface Network"
Surface Network consists of four optical component producers located in a region of Northern Germany: Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta. Alpha is the biggest company with roughly 100 13 employees. Beta and Gamma both have about 30 employees, and Delta has seven. Figure 5 displays Surface Network, also indicating different firm sizes (as measured by full time employees (FTEs)) and tie strengths (as measured by subjective evaluations of interviewees) between the firms of the network.
The common goal of Surface Network members is to combine their individual expertise to produce devices that use components from each member company. Today, they jointly produce highly sophisticated scientific devices worth several million dollars for natural scientists wanting to analyse the physical attributes of surfaces on a nanometre level. In order to achieve this end, they have developed a sophisticated collaboration routine: Surface Network gets external requests from customers to build tailor-made devices that use components from all the network companies. Once a client places an order, manufacturing tasks for individual components are distributed among the network members by a so-called lead partner. The lead partner then continues to buy those components from the others, who act as network-internal suppliers.
Such a practice was suspected to be self-reinforcing because as soon as the members have coordinated one way of working together, it seems unlikely that a unilateral (I5a) 1 or joint deviation (I5b) would be possible without harming at least one partner. Delta produced a high energy component. Additionally, Alpha formulated some "ideal goals"
Genesis of the network:
for the network, including a distribution of tasks without overlaps and an exchange of ownership shares.
Development over time:
Alpha deliberately designed the network to be "adaptive to outside circumstances" and rejected the option to establish a system of elaborate contracts between the partners. This meant that relational practices in general and bargaining practices in particular were not deliberately designed but were allowed instead to emerge from the interactions between the actors. In the subsequent 'trial and error' period, the network members tested which bargaining arrangements were working for them. For instance, the initial distribution of manufacturing tasks was once contested by Alpha when it tried to redistribute some highly profitable tasks from Gamma to Beta. Alpha justified this attempt by claiming that Beta was more capable of performing the tasks than Gamma, so that the overall network would benefit from a further specialisation of its members. This attempt failed, however, because Gamma did not agree to it. On the one hand, Gamma disagreed regarding Beta's alleged superiority and instead insisted that their capabilities could match Beta's. On the other hand, Gamma expected a loss in profits if it gave up some tasks and no alternative compensation could be found. Regarding internal supplies during the 'trial and error' period, the network agreed on transfer prices 25% below list prices that have been reproduced in the actual prices ever since. The distribution patterns of Surface Network are not codified in contracts or other documents but instead rely on oral agreements and actual practising. All interview partners highlighted the fact that contracts are not capable of codifying the trustful relationships that Surface Network is based on. In one case, the wish to sign a contract was even interpreted as a sign of mistrust.
Surface Network has grown substantially since its inception. Initial purchase orders were small and provided a means to test the modes of cooperation among the partners. Today, Surface Network is capable of processing orders in the region of up to two million Euros. At the same time, a noticeable asymmetry has developed. While Alpha has grown by almost 400% since the start of the network, its partners have only experienced growth between 50%
and 100%.
Path analysis: A path analysis of Surface Network reveals that all three phases of path development can be found. The three indicators of a preformation phase are present: as required by the theory of organizational path dependence, there used to be initial alternatives to the bargaining practice (I1). For instance, Alpha had considered an elaborate system of contracts (before dismissing the idea). Moreover, it outlined a series of "inner goals" that were later on attempted (I2). In the "trial and error" period, the network members tested which bargaining arrangements were working for them. It can thus be interpreted as a series of "small events" (I3).
Moreover, there is evidence of the indicators of a path formation phase. The bargaining practice has been applied with subsequent increases in the volume of orders that Surface Network could process (I4). Simultaneously, in the trial and error period, some alternative modes of distribution and cooperation were dismissed so that the number of alternatives diminished (I6).
Most importantly, self-reinforcing mechanisms based on coordination effects as well as complementarities can be discerned in the development trajectory of Surface Network. As outlined in the theory section, indicator I5a of coordination effects requires that no partner successfully deviates from a once established bargaining practice. Indeed, Alpha's attempt to redistribute some tasks from Gamma to Beta failed. This supports the conclusion that coordination effects had stabilized the initial distribution of tasks. Complementarities have also stabilised the bargaining practice. As also outlined in the theory section, indicator 5c of complementarities requires that no company substitutes the capabilities of their partners. All network members highlight the fact that it is necessary to cooperate with their partners in order to fulfil the clients' desires for sophisticated devices that combine several components.
At the same time, the members point out that they are unable to reproduce their partners' manufacturing abilities in-house, as they lack their expertise.
There are also some indications that the current bargaining practice is locked-in: there have been attempts to make changes to the current practice -yet those failed (I7). At the same time, alternatives have continued to disappear (I8). For instance, a dissolution of the network is now almost impossible, as many customers perceive Surface Network as one entity. The partners are "unwilling" to change the status quo (I9) because they all profit from their collaborative venture. They are also "unable" to unilaterally change the bargaining practice as exemplified by Alpha's failed attempt to redistribute manufacturing tasks.
Case study B:
The "X-Ray Network"
X-Ray Network consists of 13 companies and research institutes in a region in Eastern
Germany (see figure 6 ). The network organizations have highly specialised R&D and manufacturing expertise that enables them to produce sophisticated components for X-ray devices.
-
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The common goal of the network is to combine their individual components in order to manufacture sophisticated devices for specific application purposes that yield high profit margins, e.g. an X-ray analysis of solar cells. Today, the network members are very successful at doing so, jointly generating an annual revenue of more than €20 mio. Thus, the network members complement each other and the resulting benefit is distributed among them.
Moreover, they have devised a complex coordination process called "roadmapping" that enables them to identify, evaluate and implement joint opportunities. This successful practice was suspected to be self-reinforcing because the network members increasingly complement each other, hindering alterations to the technology promoted as well as the way the resulting benefit is distributed among them.
Genesis of the network:
Again, the successful practice took years to develop. In the 1990s, the X-ray competencies in Berlin were dispersed and uncoordinated. Prior to the reunification of Germany, two separate X-ray communities existed in East and West Berlin. After the fall of the Wall, many researchers in the former East founded their own companies or were transferred to newly established research institutes.
X-Ray Network emerged during the mid-1990s. In 1994, the still influential leader of a former East German research institute founded his own company. He orchestrated the X-ray actors of Berlin to work jointly on a project aimed at creating a revolutionary generation of Xray detectors that could work at room temperatures, thus avoiding expensive cooling systems. During the second project, the initial distribution of manufacturing tasks was unilaterally challenged by X-Instruments when it decided to manufacture a stimulation unit itself and equip all X-ray devices with it, thus making Kapillarsys' development obsolete.
After some period of disagreement, Kapillarsys ultimately agreed to this substitution but required the following three types of compensation. First, X-Instruments had to buy all optics for the mobile X-ray device from Kapillarsys at a favourable price. Second, Kapillarsys was allowed to buy detectors from X-Instruments at a favourable rate. Third, Kapillarsys and XInstruments were both given the right to manufacture new devices for new applications that combined the new detector with its complementary parts. All three provisions were codified in a supplementary agreement.
After 2001, X-Ray Network officially became part of OpTecBB, a from then on statesupported regional cluster of optics companies and research institutes. Within this official structure, the member organizations started to develop "roadmaps" that laid out plans of how the individual components were going to be developed and how the components could be combined to produce new devices for new applications. Roadmaps were written in 2003 and 2006, each with a five-year planning horizon. The roadmaps led to further generations of the detector and its complementary components. It was also discussed whether the whole network should form a virtual company and sell the lucrative devices jointly. However, the network stuck to the arrangement in which new devices were either manufactured by X-Instruments or Kapillarsys.
Internal deliveries between the network members were never exclusive. Even though the overall network never did recommend any discounts between the companies, the network members still decided to grant each other favourable terms bilaterally. Such terms were never fixed in framework contracts or similar written documents but instead relied on oral commitments. The three indicators of a path formation phase can also be discerned. Once the supplementary agreement had allocated the manufacturing tasks, this pattern was adopted increasingly by the actors during the time of the roadmap (I4). In all projects initiated during the roadmap years, X-Instruments was in charge of developing better detectors, Kapillarsys improved its X-ray optics, X-Tubes continued to improve its X-ray tubes, and device manufacturing was done by either X-Instruments or Kapillarsys. At the same time, alternatives like the "virtual company" were ruled out (I6).
The successive stabilisation of the allocation of tasks was driven by self-reinforcing coordination effects and complementarities. When X-Instruments unilaterally deviated from the initial allocation of tasks by taking over the production of stimulation units, it could not simply go on with business as usual but had to compensate Kapillarsys for this. This indicates that a pure unilateral deviation was always impossible, which is in accordance with indicator 5a of coordination effects. Similarly, the joint deviation that both partners agreed on was not simply a zero-sum redistribution of tasks but included a compensatory deal. Hence, a "pure" Case study C: The "Photonics Network"
Photonics Network consists of over 40 companies and research institutes in a Northern region of Germany. In this paper, we will focus on only one major development of Photonics Network, the so-called "fibre-to-the-home" (FTTH) household access points. The goal of this new technology is to develop and produce modems that allow households to be directly 22 connected to glass fibre networks, thus omitting traditional solutions based on copper and multiplying the current rate of data transmission by several orders of magnitude. Figure 7 represents Photonics Network; the companies and research institutes involved in developing FTTH are highlighted with a gray circle.
FTTH is still a technology "under construction", as many of its production parameters are not yet finalized. It was suspected that a technological decision might stabilise the distribution of manufacturing tasks and thus the bargaining practice. Moreover, once a supply chain is established for the manufacturing of FTTH-access points there is reason to believe that a once adopted solution will be repeated and alternative solutions will be increasingly ruled out. However, it is far from clear that the technology will be successful on the market, so that a lock-in phase cannot yet be detected. It has yet to be shown whether there will be a replication of the bargaining practice once the product is introduced onto the market (I7). Different technologies will bring along different distributions of manufacturing tasks and different internal supply arrangements. It follows that alternatives have not been marginalized yet (I8) and that the partners can still change the course of their developments instead of being "unwilling", "unaware" or "unable" (I9).
Besides the distribution of manufacturing tasks, rules for network-internal deliveries have yet to be established, both because the cooperation contracts leave these questions open and because the technology has not progressed far enough yet to answer these questions. It also remains unclear whether any future rules will be codified in contracts or not.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A cross-case analysis shows that within at least two cases, bargaining practices have become quite stable over time. This can be accounted for by the theory of organizational path dependence, which directs attention to three phases and, in particular, to the effect of selfreinforcing mechanisms in the path formation phase. Actually, there seems to be evidence of a preformation and a path formation phase in all three networks, and evidence for a lock-in phase in two of the three networks. The subsequent discussion of the cross-case analysis is summarized in figure 8 below.
To begin with, there is evidence of a preformation phase in all cases. Initially, alternative bargaining practices are discussed and tested in all cases (I1 + I2). A small event has then favoured one solution over its alternatives (I3). As would be expected from ultimately decisive events that are "not expected to take place" (Mahoney, 2000: 531) , their nature varies: a trial and error phase in Surface Network, a supplementary agreement as well as the foundation of the official network in X-Ray Network, and a change request in Photonics Network.
There also seems to be evidence of a path formation phase. Subsequent increases (I4)
can be observed in all cases, as can diminishing alternatives (I6). Self-reinforcing mechanisms based on coordination effects and complementarities work in parallel in all three cases.
Unilateral deviations (I5a) were not attempted (Photonics Network) or had to be compensated for (X-Ray Network). In Surface Network, we even found a situation in which an attempt to change the bargaining practice was undertaken yet failed because the network members were unable to agree to a re-distribution. Similarly, joint deviations (I5b) were not attempted (Surface Network and Photonics Network) or had to be compensated for (X-Ray Network).
Internal substitutions (I5c) have not taken place since the small events in any of the three cases. Instead, a virtuous cycle (I5d) of mutual co-investments in the joint capabilities was triggered in X-Ray Network and Photonics Network.
Lastly, a lock-in phase seems to have occurred in Surface Network and X-Ray Network. In both these networks, the initially adopted bargaining practices have been replicated several times (I7). At the same time, the number of remaining alternatives has been diminishing but is not down to zero (I8), as the partners actively uphold alternative cooperation partners by occasionally working together with them. The type of lock-in (I9) seems to be "unwilling" for both Surface Network and X-Ray Network. In Surface Network, "unable" is also discernable. For Photonics Network, a lock-in cannot be diagnosed (yet), as the core technology developed by its members has not (yet) matured to marketability.
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Three conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of the cross-case analysis. First, this paper shows that bargaining practices in inter-organizational networks can indeed exhibit path dependencies; a supplementing inertia-import from organizations (Walker et al., 1997) .
Second, it reconstructs the temporal ordering of events that may lead to such a situation:
starting from a situation in which several alternative bargaining arrangements are on a more or less equal footing, a small event -which can take various forms -sets off a self-reinforcing process based on both coordination effects and complementarities, which increasingly favours one solution and diminishes its alternatives. This process may even lead to a lock-in where one solution is replicated over and over again, making the adoption of alternatives ever more unlikely. As bargaining practices are one particular type of network management or relational practice, the third conclusion of this paper is that inter-organizational networks as such canbut do not need to -become path-dependent by a sequence of events similar to the one just described. This paper's contribution is twofold. First, we have operationalized the abstract threephase model of organizational path dependence with nine empirical indicators. We have also operationalized the core of path dependence by finding sub-indicators for two types of selfreinforcing mechanisms -coordination effects and complementarities. This has enabled us to directly compare our three cases and identify similar patterns across them. We suspect that such an operationalization may also enable cross-comparison between different studies, thus helping to unify the research on organizational path dependence by providing a common framework of reference for empirical analyses.
Second, our study contributes to the debate on the stability of network forms of organization (Kim et al., 2006) . It could be shown that in all three cases, the network bargaining practices emerged through processes that featured small events, were stabilised by self-reinforcing mechanisms, and -in two out of three cases -resulted in inter-organizational 
